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1. Overview  
The illicit trade in wildlife has been estimated to be worth between US$ 7–19 billion annually, 
involving a wide range of species including insects, reptiles, amphibians, fish and mammals. It 
concerns both live, and dead, specimens and products. The specimens and products are used 
for pharmaceutical, ornamental or traditional medicinal purposes. The current state of the 
evidence regarding criminal networks and the illicit wildlife trade in the East and Southern Africa 
region is limited, often relying on limited data and anecdotal evidence. The evidence that does 
exist, points to an increasingly organised trade involving a diverse range of wildlife and a 
multitude of actors operating locally and internationally. It encompasses both loose connections 
between illicit hunters, corrupt officials and much more powerful organised crime networks. There 
has also been an increasing concern that such networks might be working with militias and 
terrorist networks which target wildlife to generate funding.  
This five day help desk review provides an overview of academic, policy and practitioner 
literature that examines the illicit wildlife trade and criminal networks. Whilst there exists’ a broad 
consensus that illegal wildlife trade is a pressing and growing concern, there is much debate as 
to what this trade entails and who the key actors are. It is important to highlight that illicit wildlife 
trade involves a broad range of actions, receiving different levels of attention from various 
academic, policy and practitioner communities. This being said there is increasing agreement on 
the stages involved in the illicit wildlife trade and the nature of the criminal networks involved. 
Key messages include:  
• Studies of the illicit wildlife trade and the criminal networks involved, often involve certain 
assumptions. These require further critical analysis to explore the complex dynamics of 
the illicit wildlife trade. It is a diverse and fluid phenomenon, confounding attempts to 
characterise it as a singular trade that can be tackled by a common approach. 
• The illicit wildlife trade is not exclusively a problem of extracting high-value wildlife 
products to generate profits for organised criminal networks. The trade may also be part 
of local livelihood strategies in poor and marginalised communities. 
• Illicit trading networks defy neat categorisations of legal‒illicit, state‒society, public‒
private and formal‒informal. Rather, they span a range of relationships and links which 
are difficult to capture using singular and unproblematic definitions. 
• The illicit wildlife trade involves a number of broad stages or elements. Providing a 
breakdown of these enables a greater sense of how criminal networks are formed of 
different actors up and down the supply chain. The logistics of wildlife trafficking are 
complex and highly variable across Africa, but there are commonly three distinct phases - 
poaching, trafficking, and retail. Each of these stages is increasingly professionalised and 
dominated by criminal and corruption networks. 
• The illicit wildlife trade is trans-boundary and involves cross-border criminal syndicates. 
In the era of global free trade, the ease of communication and movement of goods and 
money facilitate the operations of groups involved in illicit trade. Driven by perceptions of 
low risk and high profit, indications have emerged of the illicit wildlife trade attracting 
greater interest from organised crime groups. These criminal syndicates are moving 
poached or illicitly harvested wildlife with the help of the same techniques and networks 
used for illicit trafficking in persons, weapons, drugs etc. The sourcing of wildlife is often 
undertaken by local groups including pastoralist communities, artisanal or subsistence 
hunters and even militias and terrorist groups. 
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2. Criminal networks and the illicit wildlife trade 
The illicit wildlife trade is regarded as a high profile and pressing issue, it includes a broad range 
of species that are traded for food, jewellery, clothing, pets, medicines, ornaments and souvenirs 
(Duffy, 2016). A 2014 report by the United Nations Environment Programme and INTERPOL 
states that wildlife trade is no longer a marginal issue (UNEP & Interpol, 2014: 7). The trade 
encompasses demand that is driven by a desire for luxury products as well as for meeting daily 
needs for food, clothing or medicine (Duffy, 2016: 109). The illicit trade in wildlife has become 
increasingly sophisticated and poaching of wildlife, especially of high value species (e.g. tigers, 
elephants and rhinoceros), has increased substantially.  
Ayling (2013) argues that any explanation for the persistence of the illicit wildlife trade requires 
an understanding of the criminal networks involved. These encompass loose connections 
between illicit hunters, corrupt officials and much more powerful organised crime networks. There 
has also been an increasing concern that such networks might be working with militias and 
terrorist networks which target wildlife to generate funding (Wyatt & Kushner, 2014). The 
emerging picture of the illicit wildlife trade is that organised criminal networks provide the 
trafficking routes and methods to join together source countries with increasingly wealthy end-
user markets, primarily in Asia (Burn et al., 2011). 
This assertion is underscored by research commissioned by Interpol who assert that a significant 
proportion of wildlife crime is carried out by organised criminal networks, drawn by the low risk 
and high profit nature of these types of crime (UNEP & Interpol, 2014; UNODC, 2015). The same 
routes used to smuggle wildlife across countries and continents are often used to smuggle 
weapons, drugs and people. Indeed, wildlife crime often occurs hand in hand with other offences 
such as passport fraud, corruption, money laundering and murder1. Accordingly, there has been 
a growing concern about the relationships between poaching, wildlife trafficking and regional or 
global security (Duffy, 2014; Wyatt & Kushner, 2014). These relationships range from those that 
involve opportunistic criminal groups and enterprises that temporarily engage in the illicit wildlife 
trade, to organised crime networks that deal in wildlife as well as other products, to illicit wildlife 
specialists, militias and standing armies that use the trade as a means to finance their activities. 
Challenges in assessing the illicit wildlife trade and criminal 
networks involved 
It is important to note the challenges of making definitive statements about the scale and nature 
of illicit wildlife trade and the criminal networks involved. Given its illicit nature, those analyses 
that do exist often rely on limited data and anecdotal evidence. What is clear from these attempts 
to explore the issue is that the global trade in illicit wildlife is a multi-billion dollar and highly 
adaptive industry that threatens biodiversity. Despite the broad-sweeping implications of illicit 
wildlife trade, commentators have yet to describe the scope and scale of the trade (Rosen & 
Smith, 2010). In what follows I provide a broad overview of caveats that should inform the 
reading of this report: 
• There is a lack of information and understanding of how international markets for traded 
wildlife operate, data on clandestine markets are limited. The information that does exist 
                                                 
1 https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Environmental-crime/Environmental-crime 
4 
is often out-of-date and frequently conflicting. Quantitative estimates, in particular, are 
imprecise, often offered only to give a sense of the relative order of magnitude of these 
problems (UNODC, 2010). 
• Studies of the illicit wildlife trade and the criminal networks involved, often involve certain 
assumptions. These require further critical analysis to explore the complex dynamics of 
the illicit wildlife trade. It is a diverse and fluid phenomenon, confounding attempts to 
characterise it as a singular trade that can be tackled by a common approach (Duffy, 
2016). 
• There are few if any comprehensive reports documenting the global trade in illicit wildlife. 
In part, this is because the data are inherently incomplete. Confiscation records provide 
the only available data on the scope and scale of illicit trade. Nevertheless, they offer the 
best evidence available to begin to describe the number and diversity of wildlife illicitly 
traded around the world (Rosen & Smith, 2010).  
• Efforts to control illicit wildlife trade vary, as effective law enforcement is often impeded 
by the secrecy of the trade, lack of infrastructure, and a shortage of wildlife law 
enforcement officers. Without independent records of illicit trade activity and 
enforcement, no inference can be drawn from these records about a country’s effort or 
progress in controlling illicit wildlife trade (Weru, 2016). 
• The illicit wildlife trade is vast in species diversity and geographic scope. Smugglers 
conceal their goods in a variety of ways. False or invalid Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) permits are used, or CITES-listed specimens are 
concealed among similar-looking non-CITES species. Wild-caught specimens may be 
falsely declared as captive-bred. Ivory is disguised as wood. In Asia, large quantities of 
wildlife are transported across borders by truck without any effort at concealment. 
Amphibians and reptiles are found in luggage at airports. Smugglers of birds and reptiles 
commonly conceal specimens and eggs on their persons, sometimes in specially 
designed vests or underwear with pockets to hold their cargo (Rosen & Smith, 2017: 27). 
• The illicit wildlife trade is not exclusively a problem of extracting high-value wildlife 
products to generate profits for organised criminal networks. The trade is also part of 
local livelihood strategies in poor and marginalised communities (Roe et al., 2014). 
• Illicit trading networks defy neat categorisations of legal‒illicit, state‒society, public‒
private and formal‒informal. Rather, they span a range of relationships and links which 
are difficult to capture using singular and unproblematic definitions (Duffy, 2016).  
• The ability to adapt poaching operations and choose optimal trafficking routes is 
generally a feature of increased network organisation and capability. There are likely 
limits to this adaptability (for example a Ugandan regional middleman may easily displace 
his poaching networks across countries in Central Africa but would find it harder to 
operate outside the region), however there is some evidence of extreme displacement, 
such as West Africans trading in Mozambique. The most vertically integrated syndicates 
may have no regional boundaries at all (Viru & Ewing, 2014). 
Scale of the illicit wildlife trade 
Whilst evidence suggests that many African countries have been affected by organised criminal 
groups, limited attention has been given to a systematic analysis of the problem in South and 
East Africa (UNODC, 2009). Anecdotal evidence suggests that with the growth of international 
trade, its geographical location, long coastline, instability along with weak law enforcement 
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structures, the region has become an important source and transit location for the illicit wildlife 
trade (UNODC, 2009: 6). 
The illicit wildlife trade is a complex logistical enterprise that transports products from Africa to 
international markets (Lawson & Vines, 2014). Local communities at point of source do much of 
the physical hunting. It is noted that current levels of poaching cannot be sustained without 
financial support (Duffy & St John, 2013). Viru and Ewing (2014) suggest that poachers rely on 
middlemen further up the value chain for weapons, ammunition, rations, and other forms of 
support. This “seed capital” has allowed illicit criminal networks to indirectly control the scale and 
location of poaching, as well as indenture local hunters into service (Viru & Ewing, 2014: 10). 
Professionalisation has changed the paradigm of poaching from that of an “economy of 
proximity” to a networked transnational enterprise (Viru & Ewing, 2014: 10). Whilst South and 
South-East Asian demand fuels the trade in wildlife, local hunters do not source directly to 
organised crime groups. They are instead incentivised by more local sources of demand in trade 
and transportation hubs around wildlife range areas. 
The international wildlife trade is estimated by CITES to include hundreds of millions of plant and 
animal specimens2. CITES note that the trade is diverse, including live animals, plants and an 
array of wildlife products derived from them, including food products, exotic leather goods, 
wooden musical instruments, timber, tourist curios and medicines3. A number of species such as 
rhinos, tigers, great apes and elephants are also victims of the illicit trade. 
In 2005, TRAFFIC Europe estimated that the total legal trade in wildlife (not including fish and 
timber) was worth € 17.2 billion, equal to US$ 22.8 billion (Engler & Parry-Jones, 2007: 10). 
Other estimates list the legal trade at US$ 25 billion. Illicit trade is estimated to be around one-
third of the legal trade, at between US$ 7.6 and US$ 8.3 billion (Hacken, 2011). This is 
reasonably close to the estimate of US$ 10 billion cited by the Coalition Against Wildlife 
Trafficking (CAWT), an organisation supported by the U.S. State Department. However, officials 
of the United Nations Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES) highlight that countries’ self-reported data on illicit wildlife trade, can be 
unreliable (Hacken, 2011: 11).  
The scale and magnitude of the wildlife trade has grown tremendously such that income from 
illicit wildlife trade now ranks among the top global sources of illicit wealth (Weru, 2016). Whilst it 
is difficult to estimate the total amount of wildlife traded illicitly due to the clandestine nature of 
the trade, a number of studies have tried to establish values. Table 1 provides a comparison of 
the scale of illicit wildlife trade compared to other sources of illicit cash. 
                                                 
2 https://www.cites.org/ 
3 https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.php 
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Table 1: Scale of illicit wildlife trade as compared to other sources of illicit cash 
 Global Financial Integrity 2009 
(USD) 
Havoscope 2012 (USD) 
Drug $320 billion $323 billion 
Counterfeiting Total $250 billion $450 billion 
Humans $31.6 billion $32 billion 
Oil $10.8 billion $53.64 billion (gas & oil) 
Wildlife $7.8 to 10 billion $19 billion 
Timber $7 billion $30 billion (illicit logging) 
Fish $4.2 to 9.5 billion  $23.5 billion (illicit fishing) 
Waste Dumping No data $11 billion 
Art and Culture Property $3.4 to $6.3 billion $10 billion 
Small arms and Light weapons $0.3 to $1 billion $ 1 billion 
Source: Haken (2011) Havoscope (2012) cited in UNEP (2012: 3) 
According to Hacken (2011), Sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia are the major supply 
regions for several of the largest illicit animal markets, including elephant ivory, rhino horn, and 
tiger parts. On the demand side, it is broadly accepted that the largest consumers of illicit wildlife 
are China, the United States, and the European Union (Hacken 2011). See table 2 for an 
overview of traded wild fauna in Kenya. 
Table 2: Overview of traded wild fauna in Kenya 
Group/Species Part/Form Destination 
Elephant Ivory (raw & worked)  East Asia 
Rhino Horns South-East Asia 
Cat family (Lion, Cheetah, Leopard) Skins/live pets Middle East, Europe, USA 
Reptiles (chameleon, lizards, 
snakes and tortoises) 
Live pets, venom Europe, America, Asia 
Pangolin Live specimens, scales East and South-East Asia 
Source: R. Muasya, Kenya Wildlife Service cited in Weru (2016: 12) 
Stages of the illicit wildlife trade 
The illicit wildlife trade involves a number of broad stages or elements. Providing a breakdown of 
these enables a greater sense of how criminal networks are formed of different actors up and 
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down the supply chain. The logistics of wild life trafficking are complex and highly variable across 
Africa, but there are commonly three distinct phases - poaching, trafficking, and retail. UNEP and 
Interpol (2014) comment that each of these stages is increasingly professionalised, dominated by 
criminal and corruption networks. Viru and Ewing (2014: 10-11) provide a descriptive account of 
these stages. 
Poaching: During the poaching phase, animals are killed and valuable parts removed. Poachers 
- often poor subsistence farmers - are recruited by organised crime figures from African bush 
towns that act as trafficking middlemen. These middlemen outfit the poachers with weapons and 
supplies. At this stage, profits are lowest and adverse human impact highest. Poaching parties 
comprised of 10 individuals or more are paid as little as $30/ kg for their time in the bush, a 
fraction of the value of animal parts at Asian retail prices, or even at prices in intermediate 
African trafficking hubs (Viru & Ewing, 2014: 10). Marginalised populations living along the 
peripheries of ranges bear the full brunt of the trade’s negative externalities: militarisation and 
banditry, increased petty corruption, and the destruction of tourist-drawing nature reserves.  
According to Viru & Ewing (2014: 11) actors up the supply chain are able to “capture” poorer 
neighbours, turning artisanal hunters and local actors into the agents of a transnational criminal 
enterprise. Poaching is not a uniform enterprise, and local trends play an important role in 
influencing the nature of poaching and the manner in which poachers interact with middlemen, 
“kingpins,” and individual traffickers. Table 3 highlights flows of ivory goods within Africa.  
Trafficking: Once animal parts have has been poached, these are transported to a retail market, 
generally in Asia. Trafficking can be roughly divided into two stages, the first of which includes all 
trafficking activities within Africa, before the contraband is packaged into a container 
(containerised) for international transport. Here, profits begin to rise, principally accruing to 
individuals whose actions drive the trade: the middlemen, corrupt politicians, conflict generals, 
and logistics specialists (Viru & Ewing, 2014). The second phase of trafficking encompasses all 
activities after a consignment is containerised. This division is not arbitrary; it is generally at this 
stage that transnational syndicates and Asian organised crime get involved in the trade. 
Retail: At the retail phase, animal products are worked, carved, and sold, generally in an Asian 
country. Further analysis of retail markets is essential to forging a long-term solution to the 
poaching crisis. 
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Table 3: Ivory hot spots and flows 
Poaching area Poaching pressure Approximate Elephant 
Population 
Main Ivory Exit 
Routes 
DRC High, Decreasing 4,704 Uganda, Kenya, 
Sudan 
CAR/Chad Northern 
Cameroon 
High, Decreasing 2,131 Sudan, Libya 
Gabon/ROC Southern 
Cameroon 
High, Increasing 74,584 Togo, Cameroon, 
Nigeria 
Tanzania Northern 
Mozambique 
High, Increasing 74,629 Tanzania, Kenya, 
Mozambique 
Southern Mozambique/ 
South Africa 
Low* 23,889 Mozambique, South 
Africa 
Kenya Medium, Increasing 27,136 Kenya 
Zimbabwe Medium, Increasing 51,141 Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique, South 
Africa 
* In South Africa, the trade is primarily in rhino, where poaching levels are high, and rising 
Source: Viru & Ewing (2014: 11) 
3. Actors and groups involved in the illicit wildlife trade 
The illicit wildlife trade is trans-boundary and involves cross-border criminal syndicates. In the era 
of global free trade, the ease of communication and movement of goods and money facilitate the 
operations of groups involved in illicit trade (EIA, 2008). Driven by perceptions of low risk and 
high profit, indications have emerged of the illicit wildlife trade attracting greater interest from 
organised crime groups (UNEP, 2012). These criminal syndicates are moving poached or illicitly 
harvested wildlife with the help of the same sophisticated techniques and networks used for illicit 
trafficking in persons, weapons, drugs and other contraband (Scanlon, 2012). Simultaneously, 
the sourcing of wildlife is often undertaken by local groups including pastoralist communities, 
artisanal or subsistence hunters and even militias and terrorist groups. Below is a brief overview 
of the range of groups involved in wildlife crime and trade (Viru & Ewing, 2014; ESAAMLG, 2016: 
22-28; Weru, 2016):  
Subsistence or artisanal hunters/poachers: Weru (2016) comments that poaching and 
trafficking networks are usually diffuse but highly integrated. The poachers are often locals with 
knowledge of the terrain and affiliated with one or more middlemen (Weru, 2016). Analysis 
undertaken by the ESAAMLG (2016) highlighted that member countries identified poverty as the 
driving force for subsistence poachers, exploited by syndicates to coerce people to take part in 
poaching activities. The poachers take high risk for comparatively little reward. They will usually 
pass the horns to a syndicate member after the killing has been done.  
These groups initially poached to supply local markets, but the emerging trend is that they have 
been co-opted or crowded out by an illicit commercial trade that is monopolised by organised 
9 
crime, and enabled by government functionaries, security forces, and businessmen (Weru, 
2016). Poachers that are not connected to networks will often be involved in killing animals, but 
usually expose themselves to arrest while searching for buyers.  
Not all actors in the market are full-time professionals, however, and some of those sourcing 
wildlife products may be informal participants. Hunting remains a form of livelihood for 
communities in both Africa and Asia (UN, 2010). Poachers may also approach local hunters with 
an offer to buy the wildlife products desired (UN, 2010: 152).  
Professional poachers/snipers: Well-organised groups have been documented, and it is clear 
that some have turned the illicit wildlife trade into a business (ESAAMLG, 2016). ESAAMLG 
(2016) found that unlike subsistence poachers, professional poachers/snipers have well-
structured operations and use high technology methods for poaching activities.  
ESAAMLG (2016) found that they are occasionally in formal employment, in some other 
profession or in business (e.g. police officers, soldiers, security intelligence operatives, etc.). 
Their role is to procure firearms, spot/track and kill the animals. In contrast to subsistence 
poachers, snipers are contracted on account of their perceived expertise in killing specific 
targeted animals, as well as their skills in using firearms. ESAAMLG (2016) note that in some 
countries, especially those with a recent history of conflict, poachers have had military training. 
This group sometimes involves experienced criminal gangs that are part of a more organised and 
structured group.  
Corrupt officials: Every year, the national parks of Africa and Asia report thousands of cases of 
poaching. It is unclear how many of these cases involve the collaboration of rangers. The 
concentration of endangered species in game parks may make the professional poacher’s job 
easier. If they are able to corrupt game wardens, they can secure access to a steady stream of 
well-tracked and healthy animals (UNODC, 2010: 152).  
Militant and terrorist groups: The links between the illicit wildlife trade and militant and terrorist 
groups, while they have received wide coverage, are tenuous. The United Nations report that Al-
Shabaab in Somalia use proceeds from illicit charcoal trade to finance their operations, earning 
between US$ 38 and US$ 68 million a year from charcoal sales and taxation (UNODC, 2015). 
However there is no conclusive evidence that al-Shabaab is also involved in the illicit trafficking 
of ivory, rhino horn, or other wildlife products. Indeed, a study by Schneider (2014) argues that 
the linkages between ivory trafficking and terrorist groups are exaggerated and at times 
imaginary. 
In contrast, other known militia groups operating in central African countries and South Sudan 
may be benefiting from illicit ivory transhipped through Kenya (UNODC, 2015). A study 
commissioned by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and INTERPOL has 
linked ivory trafficking worth US$ 4–12 million each year to the Janjaweed militia operating in 
Sudan, Chad and Niger. The report also describes how the poaching and trafficking of forest 
elephants provides income for militia groups in the DRC and Central African Republic (CAR), 
likely including the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) (UNEP & Interpol, 2014; Schneider 2014). 
The military: Historically, militaries have been able to dominate poaching because they were 
among the few organisations with the logistical capability to access global markets (Viru & Ewing, 
2014). The role of standing armies or the use of poaching and smuggling as part of a war 
strategy by states is often overlooked in debates about the illicit wildlife trade; yet high-value 
wildlife products are highly ‘lootable’ and have served as the financial underpinning for numerous 
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conflicts across sub-Saharan Africa, including Uganda in the 1970s and 1980s, Angola and 
Mozambique in the 1980s and the Great Lakes region since 1996 (Humphreys & Smith, 2011). 
Today, the environment is different. Better infrastructure, technology, and individual 
empowerment have facilitated the expansion of illicit transnational economies, including in 
wildlife. Most subsistence or artisanal poaching for supply to local markets has since been co-
opted or crowded out by an illicit commercial trade that is monopolised by organised crime, and 
enabled by government functionaries, security forces, and businessmen (Viru & Ewing, 2014).  
The porters (transporters): According to EASSMLG (2016), porters are the individuals that 
establish and maintain radio contact with the snipers (poachers). Law enforcement agency 
reports indicate that the snipers inform the porters of the location of a shooting, and direct them 
to retrieve the tusks and/or horns. Their role is to carry them through secret routes to the point at 
which they will be passed on to intermediaries. The latter may be involved in some of the 
transportation, if distances are long, by picking up consignments at agreed points. 
Possible involvement of corrupt public officials and law enforcement: According to 
EASSMLG (2016), member countries indicated that they had identified cases in which law 
enforcement officials had been involved in illicit wildlife trafficking for financial gains by corruptly 
assisting the criminals. However, the countries could not indicate methods in which finances or 
bribes were channelled to such corrupt officials. 
First level intermediaries: Usually located in an urban area to receive the products from the 
porters and arrange further transportation to the dealer. Also responsible for hiring of lower level 
actors and for paying them. The types of businesses in which intermediaries tend to be involved 
in the ESAAMLG region are cash intensive. In retail, they would involve fast moving 
merchandise, such as clothing, textiles, construction equipment and pharmaceuticals. Cash 
generating businesses are strategic. They provide a pretext for possession of large sums of 
money, which can be mingled with proceeds of trafficking. 
Second level intermediaries: They are often closely connected to markets, which are 
predominantly Asian. This level of intermediary has a presence in the ESAAMLG region, often 
disguising illicit activities through running a legitimate, but often-strategic business in commodity 
import/export, transportation, pharmaceuticals, scrap metal or general retail. Familiarity with 
customs processes and personnel is considered to be important, as is access to trade routes. 
Alternative to first and second level intermediaries (as per above): There may be only one 
level of intermediary, who is based locally but connected (by nationality or/and through trade 
relationships) with dealers in Asia. 
Courier: Usually hired by 2nd level intermediaries for cross border transportation of products. 
Consignments transported by air are usually accompanied by couriers, and may be concealed in 
diplomatic luggage. In the case of larger volumes or consignments that are bulky in nature, 
shipment is preferred. Risk of detection determines whether it is necessary to involve a shipping 
agent or the operator of the vessel (ESAAMLG, 2016).  
Processing points and retail markets: Following its procurement, ivory and rhino horns have to 
be transported to processing points and retail markets, most of which are currently in China, 
Taiwan and Vietnam. It is generally at this stage that transnational syndicates and organised 
crime get involved. A growing number of intermediaries are expatriate Chinese and Vietnamese 
nationals living in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESAAMLG, 2016).  
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Table 4: Wildlife from Africa and South-East Asia to Asia 
Route  
Source Elephants from Central Africa; rhinoceros from South Africa, Zimbabwe 
and north-east India; various wildlife from Myanmar, Cambodia and the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
Vector By sea and air from Africa; by land and sea within Asia 
Destination China (including Taiwan, Province of China and Hong Kong, China), 
Viet Nam, Japan and other parts of Asia 
Dimensions  
Annual market volume Elephant ivory: 75 tons 
Rhino horn: 800 kilograms 
Tiger parts: Perhaps 150 tiger skins and about 1,500 kilograms of tiger 
bones 
Annual value at destination Elephant ivory: US$ 62 million 
Rhino horn: US$ 8 million 
Tiger parts: US$ 5 million 
Traffickers  
Groups involved Asian expatriate communities in Africa and Asia 
Elephant ivory: Militias, rural Africans, businesspeople in Asia and 
Africa 
Rhino horn: Organised poaching gangs 
Residence of traffickers Poachers in source countries, wholesalers in Asian and Africa, retailers 
in Asia and Africa 
Threat  
Estimated trend Elephant Ivory: increasing in some areas 
Rhino horn: sharply increasing 
Potential effects Tigers and black rhinos may become extinct in the wild; impact on 
south-East Asian wildlife unclear; promotion of corruption and organised 
crime. 
Likelihood of effects being realised For tigers, high; for black rhinos, fair 
Source: UNDOC (2010: 151) 
Structure of poaching and trafficking networks 
Poaching and trafficking networks are diffuse, spread over numerous individuals linked, at times, 
by sophisticated financial, intelligence sharing, and transportation networks (UNODC, 2010). 
Poachers are typically linked to an individual affiliated with one or more middlemen or patrons 
who, through corrupt means, provide or facilitate access to operational logistics, namely 
weapons, intelligence on ranger movements, supplies and financing (Viru and Ewing, 2014).  
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Commentators highlight that poaching has evolved from an “economy of proximity”, in which the 
primary determinant of poaching was access to wildlife, into an “economy of networks” that links 
together multiple regions, skillsets, and areas of control within a single ‘syndicate’ (Viru & Ewing, 
2014). It appears relatively rare for transnational traffickers to source directly from the forest 
periphery, or from actual poachers. Instead, a series of local middlemen funnel supplies to a 
“regional middleman” who serves as an intermediary between local supply and international 
demand. These individuals or entities coordinate relations between the African and South and 
South-East Asian end of operations, and generally manage operations prior to containerisation.  
African patrons, by virtue of their access to transnational traffickers and their control of local ivory 
flows, can command significant shares of profit, and can afford to distribute higher than average 
wages down the value chain (Viru & Ewing, 2014). Their ability to outbid local demand (in 
addition to available recourse to violence or coercion) allows relatively smaller numbers of 
syndicates and individuals to dictate the terms of regional poaching and control its scale. Two 
models of poaching are commonly identified (Viru & Ewing, 2014). 
The “landlord model”, the poaching patron owns or controls elephant ranges, and can either 
directly control the hunting or rent out controlled access. Such a network often has a hierarchical 
form of organisation with static control of territory and strong direct control over hunting parties. 
The model is best associated with the case studies of Tanzania and Zimbabwe, where powerful 
businessmen and politicians own licenses or exert strong influence over hunting and safari 
concessions, and thus seem to be able to control the scale and manner of hunting on their lands.  
The “distributor model” features a patron who supplies equipment, but exercises little direct 
control over the hunting. Variations of the distributor model are common and can overlap the 
landlord model. Conflict generals in the DRC are examples of the distributor model. They supply 
arms and ammunition to militant groups, and expect ivory to flow back up the chain to their 
criminal networks, but appear to have little concern over how and where hunting occurs. 
Figure 2: Poaching Criminal Syndicate Supply-Chain 
 Source: Focus Africa Foundation (2016) 
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Structure of rhino horn trade syndicates 
The rise in more organised forms of commercial rhino poaching has been detailed in the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) African Rhino Specialist Group report to 
the CITES CoP15. It indicated that between 2005 and 2009, the number of rhino deaths due to 
snaring had declined, while death by shooting had increased (Milliken et al., 2009: 4).  
The National Wildlife Crime Reaction Unit (NWCRU) in South Africa has identified five levels at 
which rhino horn trade syndicates are operating within and outside South Africa (see figure 1). 
Illicit rhino horn trade occurs along a chain that extends from the poacher at a local level in an 
African range State to an end-use buyer at an international level, generally in an Asian country 
and, more specifically, usually Viet Nam. Middleman buyers, exporters and couriers all play roles 
along the trade chain, dealing with horns derived from all sources, including sport hunted 
trophies, stock thefts and poached animals (Milliken, 2012: 78). 
Figure 2: Levels of organised crime involved in rhino horn trade 
 
Source: Milliken (2014: 18) 
4. References  
Ayling J. (2013). What sustains wildlife crime? Rhino horn trading and the resilience of criminal 
networks. Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy 16:57–80. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13880292.2013.764776 
Burn, R. et al. (2011). Global trends and factors associated with the illegal killing of elephants. 
PLoS ONE, 6 (9). http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0024165 
Duffy, R. & St John, F. (2013). Poverty, Poaching and Trafficking: What are the Links. Evidence 
on Demand. http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/17836/1/EoD_HD059_Jun2013_Poverty_Poaching.pdf 
Duffy, R. (2016). The illicit wildlife trade in global perspective. In Elliot, L. & Schaedla, W. 
Handbook of Transnational Environmental Crime. Edward Elgar. 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309679313_The_illicit_wildlife_trade_in_global_perspe
ctive 
EIA (2008). Environmental Crime: a Threat to our Future. Environmental Investigation Agency. 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/NGO/EIA_Ecocrime_report_0908_final_draft_low.pdf 
14 
EIA (2016). Time for Action: End the Criminality and Corruption Fuelling Wildlife Crime. EIA. 
https://eia-international.org/wp-content/uploads/EIA-Time-for-Action-FINAL-1.pdf 
Engler, M. and Parry-Jones, R. (2007). Opportunity or Threat: the Role of the European Union in 
Global Wild Life Trade. TRAFFIC. http://agris.fao.org/agris-
search/search.do?recordID=XF2015017467 
ESAAMLG (2016). A Special Typologies Project Report on Poaching and Illicit Trade in Wildlife 
and Wildlife Products and Associated Money Laundering in the ESAAMLG Region. ESAAMLG. 
https://www.esaamlg.org/userfiles/Typologies%20Report%20on%20the%20Wildlife%20Crimes%
20and%20Related%20ML.pdf 
Haken, J. (2011). Transnational Crime in the Developing World. Global Financial Integrity.  
http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/transcrime/gfi_transnational_crime_we
b.pdf 
Humphreys, J. & Smith, M. (2011). War and wildlife: the Clausewitz connection. International 
Affairs 87:121–142. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2011.00963.x/full 
Lawson, K. & Vines, A. Global Impacts of the Illicit Wildlife Trade: the Costs of Crime, Insecurity 
and Institutional Erosion. Chatham House. 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0214Wildlife.pdf 
Milliken, T. et al. (2009). African and Asian Rhinoceroses – Status, Conservation and Trade 
CoP15, Doc 45-1 Annex CITES Secretariat, Geneva, Switzerland. 
Milliken, T. (2012). The South Africa – Viet Nam Rhino Horn Trade Nexus: A deadly combination 
of institutional lapses, corrupt wildlife industry professionals and Asian crime syndicates. USAID. 
http://www.npr.org/documents/2013/may/traffic_species_mammals.pdf 
Milliken, T. (2014). Illicit trade in ivory and rhino horn: an assessment to improve law 
enforcement under the wildlife traps project. USAID. 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/W-TRAPS-Elephant-Rhino-report.pdf 
Roe, D et al. (2015). Beyond enforcement: Engaging communities in tackling wildlife crime’, 
IEED Briefing. International Institute for Environment and Development. 
http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17293IIED.pdf 
Rosen, G. & Smith, K. (2010). Summarizing the Evidence on the International Trade in Illicit 
Wildlife. EcoHealth 7, 24–32. https://link-springer-
com.ezproxye.bham.ac.uk/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs10393-010-0317-y.pdf 
Schneider, R. (2014). The Securitisation of Poaching and the Illegal Wildlife Trade in Sub-
Saharan Africa: A Necessary Evil? University of Aberdeen. 
UNEP (2012). Transnational Environmental Crime - a common crime in need of better 
enforcement. UNEP. 
https://na.unep.net/api/geas/articles/getArticlePDFWithArticleIDScript.php?article_id=95 
UNEP & Interpol (2014) The Environmental Crime Crisis: Threats to Sustainable Development 
from Illicit Exploitation and Trade in Wildlife Trade and Forest Resources. UNEP. 
https://gridarendal-
15 
website.s3.amazonaws.com/production/documents/:s_document/128/original/RRAcrimecrisis.pdf
?1483646648 
UNODC (2009). Organised Crime and Trafficking in Eastern Africa. UNODC. 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/easternafrica/regional-ministerial-
meeting/Organised_Crime_and_Trafficking_in_Eastern_Africa_Discussion_Paper.pdf 
UNODC (2010). The Globalization of Crime A Transnational Organized Crime Threat 
Assessment. UNODC. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf 
UNODC (2015). Wildlife and Forest Crime: Overview. UNODC. 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/wildlife-and-forest-crime/overview.html 
Viru, V. & Ewing, T. (2014). Ivory’s Curse The Militarization & Professionalization of Poaching in 
Africa/ C4ADS. https://www.all-creatures.org/articles/ar-Ivorys-Curse-2014.pdf 
Weru, S. (2016). Wildlife Protection and Trafficking Assessment in Kenya: Drivers and trends of 
transnational wildlife crime in Kenya and its role as a transit point for trafficked species in East 
Africa. TRAFFIC. https://portals.iucn.org/library/sites/library/files/documents/Traf-126.pdf 
Wyatt, T. & Kushner, A. (2014), Global illicit wildlife product trafficking: Actors,activities, and 
assessment. University of Maryland. 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Tanya_Wyatt2/publication/280946252_Global_Illicit_Wildlife
_Product_Trafficking_Actors_Activities_and_Assessment/links/55ce03ce08ae118c85bc72d8/Glo
bal-Illicit-Wildlife-Product-Trafficking-Actors-Activities-and-Assessment.pdf 
Suggested citation 
Avis, W. (2017). Criminal networks and illicit wildlife trade. K4D Helpdesk Report 150. Brighton, 
UK: Institute of Development Studies. 
About this report 
This report is based on five days of desk-based research. The K4D research helpdesk provides rapid syntheses 
of a selection of recent relevant literature and international expert thinking in response to specific questions 
relating to international development. For any enquiries, contact helpdesk@k4d.info. 
K4D services are provided by a consortium of leading organisations working in international development, led by 
the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), with Education Development Trust, Itad, University of Leeds Nuffield 
Centre for International Health and Development, Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine (LSTM), University of 
Birmingham International Development Department (IDD) and the University of Manchester Humanitarian and 
Conflict Response Institute (HCRI). 
This report was prepared for the UK Government’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) and its partners in support of pro-poor programmes. It is licensed for 
non-commercial purposes only. K4D cannot be held responsible for errors or any 
consequences arising from the use of information contained in this report. Any views and 
opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of DFID, K4D or any other contributing 
organisation. © DFID - Crown copyright 2017. 
  
16 
5. Annex 1: Trade routes for seizures of Ivory (2000-2011) 
Source: Milliken (2014: 10) 
